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A b s t r a c t 
This research aims to demonstrate Caesar's law to protect civilians in Syria and its effect on the social 
and economic circumstances of millions of Syrians stuck in their country because of the state of the 
siege imposed by the law's sanctions. The question tries to focus on how the law can achieve its 
human aims under the negative economic consequences it has on civilians, relying on the new 
political economy approach. It tried to interpret the non-economic activity of politicians under the 
Economy cover. Accordingly, The United States continues to tighten its hold on the Syrian system 
to exercise pressure on Syria, and to make political compromises and start significant political 
reforms immediately. Still, the direct targeting of Syrian economic structures through the law-
imposed blockade has isolated the Syrian regime and cut off all official economic ties externally. It 
is encouraging the escalation of dealings with informal mediators, which has led to a sharp collapse 
in the Syrian Lira and a significant increase in consumer prices, which has been reflected negatively 





After the local economy's catastrophic failure, the Syrian crisis 
made its first decade. Ten consecutive years of warfare have 
triggered structural changes in the Syrian economy structure that 
have evolved and exacerbated the trouble of becoming one of the 
world's largest war economies. However, the last year has 
affected this collapsed economy more than the number of 
ramifications left by the consequences of the Corona pandemic, 
the sanctions imposed by the USA administration on the Syrian 
regime, or what is known as the Convention of Caesar's Act. 
On June 17, 2020, the Caesar Civil Security Act formally entered 
Syria and added a new collection of U.S. sanctions against the 
Syrian regime. Additionally, to many Syrian and overseas 
persons and institutions selling Syrian goods, supplies or military 
equipment, or even those trying to work in the country's 
reconstruction. 
 
The U.S. Administration chose to name Caesar regarding the 
dissident Syrian military photographer who revealed more than 
55,000 photos from inside the regime's prisons. Thus, it draws 
one of the most critical chapters of documenting the regime's 
crimes in Syria. 
 
This Act tries to protect civilians from the effects of the conflict 
in Syria. It contributes theoretically to hunger due to its adverse 
economic impact, especially after the regime resorted to the use 
of mediators and commercial brokers to make different supply 
deals. Effectively, it means the rise of prices, the persistence of 
the Syrian Lira depreciation, and the increase of poverty rates. It 
is seen as a problem that the Act establishes a kind of fear at the 
international level in dealing with any Syrian side, even if it is not 
a governmental part. In this case, the indirect effect is more severe 
than the direct impact itself; furthermore, there are other risks 
addressed by law in the issues of reconstruction and engineering, 
which means targeting any future attempts to rebuild what the war 
has destroyed. The Act also pushed foreign insurance or transport 
companies operating in Syria to deal with the Government 
through mediators and brokers indirectly, which are reflected 
negatively on the population (Nasr, 2020). 
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Amid this controversy, this paper focuses on the following 
problem: How can the Caesar Act protect the civilians in Syria 
achieve its humanitarian objectives in the light of the negative 
economic repercussions that it has on the Syrian people? This 
approach investigates the feasibility of the Act that got here to 
defend civilians simultaneously, as its effects are reflected 
negatively on the Syrian people's financial and social situation. 
 
2. Methodology 
Theoretically, this paper is based mainly on the entry point of the 
new political economy, where the entry points out that: " analysis 
examines the possible linkages between politics and economics 
based on theories of economics, law, and political and social 
sciences" (Development, 2008). 
 
The new political economy is essentially the theoretical approach 
developed by economists, encompassing social choice views. It 
has proved to be a real foundation for understanding the neo-
classical economists' and political scientists' economically 
irrational policies. In doing so, he presents a practical theory to 
respond to Robert Bates' difficult question: "Why should rational 
men adopt public policies that have severe consequences for the 
societies they govern? The new political economy seeks to 
understand the non-economic market for political activity, using 
the analytical language and tools of economists, and in this 
context, it examines the State; to explain the decision-making of 
political and bureaucratic elites” (Grindle, 1989).  
 
The new political economy is an essential theoretical input used 
to clarify the relationship between the political-economic 
sanctions with the Caesar Act and those sanctions' economic and 
social implications. Both do not recognize the fate of the millions 
of Syrians who have been driven into extremes by the ruling 
political classes in the United States of America and Syria. 
 
3. Results and Figures 
The Caesar Law for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Syria 
opens an extensive debate approximately its targets and its 
capacity to obtain them on the only hand. Its harmful effects on 
civilians, on the alternative hand, so it could be beneficial to 
examine the regulation and try and find out the maximum critical 
bad results it has delivered at the Syrian people. Additionally, 
seeing the highest vital viable eventualities in their punishments 
are roughly the fate. 
 
3.1. Reading on the Law 
According to the U.S. official version, the Caesar Act aims at 
depriving Syrian President Bashar El-Assad of any chance to turn 
his military victory on the ground into a political gain through 
which he devotes his chances of remaining in power indefinitely. 
The penalties provided for by the Act target entities working for 
Assad in four sectors: Oil and natural gas, the aeronautics 
industry, construction, and engineering, which include direct and 
oblique guide for the regime, including help for militias 
sponsored with the aid of using Iran and Russia working in Syria. 
The penalties are both global and local activities that comply with 
the Assad system, keeping it from exceeding such liabilities by 
circumventing them. 
 
Any economic activity will also automatically be prolonged, as 
will any dealings with Iran and any regional and international 
actors if they consider investing or working in Syria (Al Shami, 
2020). 
 
This means that the Caesar Act, unlike previous sanctions, puts 
under its authority actors from other institutions and countries 
involved in such activities, including cross-border business 
networks deemed necessary for the regime's survival. The most 
vulnerable are Hezbollah in Lebanon, in particular, and the Assad 
regime's allies in Russia, China, and Iran (Heydemann, 2020). 
 
The penalties for the Caesar Act entered into force on 
Wednesday, June 17, 2020. The same day, the State Department 
and the Treasury Department observed joint action leading to 39 
persons and organizations' appointment under direct sanctions. Of 
these 39 targets, the foreign ministry has set 15 targets under 
Executive Order No. 13,894, including the renaming of Bashar 
El-Assad, Iran's militia, General Fatimid, and Bashar al-Assad's 
wife, Asmaa El-Assad, and the fourth division of the Syrian Arab 
Army. The Treasury has identified 24 other targets under 
Executive order 13573 that target institutions as owned or 
controlled by the Syrian Government, and by Executive order 
13582 for foreign institutions providing material assistance or 
support to the Government in Syria (Caroline E. Brown, 2020). 
 
The U.S. bill attempts to focus on economic sanctions which 
primarily affect the measures related to the Central Bank of Syria, 
where all reporting problems have been resolved in terms of the 
time it takes to issue the report, its form as described in the third 
item of Article I, and the identification of appropriate 
congressional committees for supervision, which are listed as 
follows: The Foreign Affairs Committee, the Financial Services 
Committee, the House appropriations committee, the Foreign 
Relations Committee, the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
Committee, and the Senate Appropriations Committee (Caesar 
Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019). 
 
To extend, focusing on sanctions relating to foreign persons 
engaged in specific transactions, where sanctions are generally 
imposed on any unfamiliar person if the President decides to 
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engage with knowledge in one of the following expressed 
activities: (Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019). 
 
 Caught Providing financial, material or technical support, 
engaging in a significant deal with the Syrian Government 
or any other foreign person, whether a military contractor, 
mercenary, paramilitary force, acting intentionally in an 
army capacity inside Syria for or on behalf of the Syrian 
Government, the Government of the Russian Federation or 
the Government of Iran; Or any sanctioned foreign person 
with Syria. 
 involved in selling or supplying essential goods, services, 
technology, information, support, or other support 
dramatically. Facilitates maintenance or extension of the 
Syrian State's domestic natural gas, petroleum or petroleum 
products Selling or intended provision of aircraft spares or 
spare parts for military purposes in Syria for or on behalf of 
the Syrian Government to any foreign person operating in 
an area under the direct or indirect control of the Syrian 
Government or foreign forces associated with the Syrian 
Government. 
 to provide knowingly any essential goods or services 
associated with the operation of aircraft used for military 
purposes in Syria.  
 Provision- directly or indirectly- of significant construction 
or engineering services to the Syrian Government. 
 
The penalties insert anyone realized to be involved in such 
defined operations encompass the withholding of assets. The 
President sports all powers below the International Economic 
Emergency Law to withhold assets inside the United States of 
America, further stopping him from getting into American soil. It 
is inadmissible for obtaining, ineligible for, or now no longer 
accepting or returning the visa to the United States, with all 
legitimate access cancelled, with positive exceptions to the 
United Nations Headquarters Agreement (Caesar Syria Civilian 
Protection Act of 2019). 
 
Humanitarian figures or institutions have been excluded from any 
follow-up, prosecutions, or sanctions if they are active in Syria. 
This "humanitarian exclusion," reflecting similar humanitarian 
exceptions in both U.S. and European sanctions against Syria, 
aims to ensure the flow of humanitarian and medical assistance 
needed to Syria and mitigate the unintended economic 
consequences of sanctions on the Syrian people (SJAC, 2020). 
 
The U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo issued a press 
statement, in which; he spoke about his country's commitment 
toward humanitarian aids, expressing that Caesar's law was not 
targeted at it when he said: "The United States remains committed 
to working with the United Nations and international partners to 
provide life-saving assistance to the Syrian people, who are still 
suffering at the hands of the Assad A press release was released 
by U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, in which he spoke of 
his country's dedication to humanitarian aid, claiming that Caesar 
's law was not targeted when he said: "The United States remains 
committed to working with the United Nations and international 
partners to provide life-saving assistance to the Syrian people 
who are still suffering at the hands of the United Nations and 
international partners.". We are the largest single humanitarian 
donor to the Syrian people. Since the beginning of the conflict, 
we have provided more than $10.6 billion dollars in humanitarian 
aid and more than $1.6 billion dollars in non-humanitarian and 
stability assistance throughout Syria, even in areas under Assad's 
control. The Caesar Law and other U.S. sanctions on Syria do not 
target humanitarian aid to the Syrian people or hamper our 
activities to stabilize northeast Syria. We will continue our 
humanitarian assistance through our various international and 
Syrian partners, even in areas under the control of the regime" 
(Pompeo, 2020). 
 
Article 302 of the Act also permits certain waivers and 
exemptions, especially those related to activities and transactions 
subject to reporting requirements under the National Security Act 
1947. Alternatively, any transaction necessary to comply with the 
United States' obligations under the United Nations Headquarters 
Agreement, the Consular Relations Agreement, or any other 
international agreement to which the United States is a part. 
(Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019) 
 
3.2. Consequences of the Law 
Many observers believe that the Caesar Law for the Protection of 
Civilians in Syria has made a negative contribution to the 
country's social and economic life and has driven many Syrians 
into extreme poverty, especially from the middle and low classes. 
The law contributed directly to Syria's currency crisis as fears of 
its economic repercussions increased. 
 
Actually, throughout the past crisis years, the Syrian economy has 
relied on the Lebanese banking sector, where it is the gateway to 
the Syrian economy to the external world. Lebanon is the place 
where Syrian business people and individuals have deposited 
their savings and bought dollars. At the same time, its banks 
issued letters of credit and other payment facilities required by 
Syrian merchants to import goods into their domestic markets. 
The U.S. currency jumped into the Lebanese foreign exchange 
market, followed by the Syrian money, as soon as Lebanese banks 
started to limit dollar sales in August 2019-also, preventing 
depositors from making their savings in that currency. With the 
collapse of the Lebanese Lira, the Syrian Lira also retreated. At 
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the end of July 2019, the dollar cost was 606 Syrian pounds on 
the black market. It reached 635 Syrian lire at the end of August 
and rose steadily to 1,040 Syrian lire at the end of January 2020 
(Yazigi, 2020). 
 
Abu Hassan from Homs, who works in the Ministry of Oil, said 
that he was suffering after the decrease in Lira's price, adding that 
I pay about 60 thousand Syrian liras (27 dollars). That is now 
enough for only four meals for my family of seven. Fear of 
starving my kids forced me to sell a piece of land I had for ten 
years. I consider myself lucky because I had something to sell, 
and at the same time, there are people who cannot even buy 
breadcrumbs and have nothing to sell. Even this piece of land 
gave me enough money for just three months, and then I have no 
idea how to manage to feed my children (Qussai Jukhadar, 2020). 
 
Figure 1. The price of the U.S. dollar in the Syrian black market 
(in SYP) 
Source: Jihad Yazigi. (March 2020). Syria's Growing Economic 
Woes: Lebanon's Crisis, the Caesar Act and Now the 
Coronavirus. Arab Reform Initiative. P 3. 
 
As the price of the Syrian Lira continues to fall into the market, 
the social and economic conditions of millions of Syrians 
stranded in their country will deteriorate further, and the 
increasing role of brokers and brokers after the official 
international authorities’ fear dealing with the Syrian regime. 
These brokers and intermediaries maximize the benefit that 
Syrian citizens are forced to bear. 
The Caesar Act additionally explicitly targets "Syria's local 
manufacturing of natural gas, petroleum or petroleum products," 
and any individual or entity "intentionally, directly or indirectly, 
presents vital production or engineering offerings to the Syrian 
Government. 
“In practical terms, these new restrictions target the entire Syrian 
economy and reconstruction efforts” (Charles A. Sills, 2020). 
therefore, the Caesar Act is an additional deterrent to any interest 
in the Syrian economy by foreign companies and institutions, thus 
eliminating the limited possibilities remaining for the large-scale 
reconstruction of the country (Yazigi, 2020). 
 
It should be noted here that broad-based sanctions should be 
differentiated from those targeted at individuals or entities. The 
role of sanctions (broad-based as opposed to targeted) and efforts 
to end broad sanctions that have negative consequences for 
civilians and reconstruction efforts must be studied and clarified 
(Omar Dahi, 2020). 
 
In the midst of that, the Syrian regime has not been much affected, 
and that it is not interested in the social and economic status of 
the Syrians. Therefore, the worsening of economic misery is 
unlikely to change its calculations, as it should be noted that. 
Despite the heavy burden of sanctions on the regime's leadership 
and its aides, they are, in turn, offering them attractive 
opportunities to profit at the expense of the poor in the country. It 
is an opportunity that refutes the hypothesis that sanctions will 
affect the coherence and loyalty of the infrastructure of the 
regime. Otherwise, the continuation of these sanctions would be 
just a form of collective punishment that American policymakers 
must reconsider before a humanitarian catastrophe occurs (Qussai 
Jukhadar, 2020). 
 
3.3. The International Reactions 
While the European countries welcomed the sanctions imposed 
by the Caesar law, Russia, China and Iran showed their complete 
refusal of these sanctions, considering them unilateral and 
coercive sanctions that aim at complicating the situations in Syria 
after the regime is close to settling its battle against the extremist 
terrorist groups. It is a rejection that has been translated by many 
official statements and practical steps taken by these parties, 
which are allied to the Syrian regime. 
 
Over the past nine years, Moscow and Beijing have spent billions 
of dollars in support of the Syrian regime, hoping for this support 
to benefit from post-war reconstruction projects, but the Caesar 
Act has destroyed all these expectations, especially in the short 
term, so Russia and China are demanding that the U.S. ease 
sanctions so that they can continue as intended, and they have 
addressed the United States in individual statements with the need 
to lift its "unilateral" and "coercive" measures against Syria. 
Zhang Jun, China's Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations, said: "The double standards adopted by the United States 
on humanitarian issues were revealed when the "Caesar Law" was 
imposed (Vohra, 2020). Jun adds: "as vulnerable countries like 
Syria struggle with the scourge of the Coronus virus, more 
sanctions are simply inhumane and could cause additional 
disasters " (Global China Daily, 2020). 
 
In a statement dated June 17, 2020, the Russian Foreign Ministry 
confirmed that Moscow strongly opposes these sanctions, 
pointing out that "the Caesar Law, which aims at protecting 
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civilians, works to harm only ordinary Syrians " (Ministry of the 
Foreign Affairs of Federal Russia, 2020). On this basis, Russia 
has taken practical steps toward securing reconstruction contracts 
with the Syrian Government, in outright defiance of the U.S., as 
the Syrian parliament has approved a series of deals with two 
Russian oil-mining companies from three major oilfields. Igor 
Matveev, former Head of the Russian Embassy's Trade and 
Economy Department in Damascus, said Russia was considering 
a $500 million dollars project to redevelop the port of Tartus and 
build a $200 million dollars fertilizer plant in Homs (Ramani, 
2020). 
 
The Iranian reactions were represented in the Iranian Foreign 
Ministry spokesman, Sayed Abbas Moussaoui, condemning the 
imposition of new U.S. sanctions under the so-called Caesar law, 
as a violation of the international law and human principles, 
Moussaoui indicated that: "While the scourge of the virus of 
Corona dominates the world, the imposition of such inhuman 
sanctions will only increase the suffering and pain of the Syrian 
people," he said. He also declared that this country would not give 
any credibility to such cruel and unilateral sanctions, which are 
passed and imposed on the basis of bullying, and considers them 
economic terrorism against the Syrian public and continuing 
embargoes, so that the ends his talk with his country's intention 
to continue economic cooperation with the State and the Syrian 
Government like the past, and working to strengthen economic 
relations with Syria despite the sanctions" (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2020). 
 
Iran tries to protect the top regime in Syria for reasons related 
mainly to the sectarian dimension of the pro-Syrian government, 
as it has been working for many years to extend its influence in 
the Middle East, especially in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. 
Therefore, it may seem very logical that Iran rejects these 
sanctions, despite the damage it may cause, mostly as it also lives 
at the mercy of many of the previous sanctions related to its 
nuclear project. 
 
The situation did not differ much; with regard to the reactions in 
Lebanon, where Hezbollah Secretary-General, Mr. Hassan 
Nasrallah, declared that this law is the last American weapon on 
Syria, and it confirms openly and definitely the victory of the 
Syrian regime in the military, security, political and even moral 
war. He also confirmed that Syria's allies who stood with it in its 
military conflict during the last years would not abandon it in the 
face of the economic war, although their circumstances are 
difficult (Hassan Nasrallah Speech, 2020). 
 
3.4.  The Future of the Sanctions 
The scenarios of the future of the sanctions of the Caesar Civil 
Protection Act in Syria are subject to several indicators, primarily 
the humanitarian status and the futility or inability of sanctions to 
achieve their objectives for the long and medium terms, so this 
work will try to develop two different scenarios or to convey the 
contrasts:  
 
 The continuation of sanctions scenario 
Many reports expect that U.S. policy on Syria will become "more 
effective with the international community" after Joe Biden's 
arrival to the U.S. presidency, where a report published in the 
Middle East newspaper indicates that a Biden campaign 
consultant has informed some members of the Syrian community 
in America. His administration, in case of formation, will clarify 
to Russian President Vladimir Putin that there can be no U.S. or 
European support for Syria reconstruction in the absence of real 
political reform, and the consultant said that this reform should 
be meaningful and reliable movement regarding the main human 
issues and accountability. He stressed the need to release political 
prisoners while maintaining U.S. sanctions on the regime and its 
entities, including Russia (Al-Omari, 2020). 
 
The United States Special Representative on Syria, Ambassador 
James Jeffrey, has said that his country punished about 75 
individuals under the Caesar Act and other laws that it found to 
be more reasonable under certain circumstances, and according 
to Jeffrey, the current U.S. policy toward Syria will continue with 
bipartisan support, regardless of the winner of the U.S. election. 
"This is just the beginning of other waves of sanctions," he said 
at the end of the statement. Again, we start with the people closest 
to Assad because we believe it is imperative to focus on the 
accountability of those who financed him and those who enabled 
his military " (Al-Awsat, 2020). 
 
Thus, the primary objective of sanctions from the American point 
of view is to bring down the Assad regime, as focusing on the 
people closest to its surroundings is evidence of trying to break 
down the elite cohesion of the administration, which is the point 
of strength through which it has continued to govern throughout 
the previous years of conflict. All the political regimes that have 
been buffeting the Arab Spring have not been able to withstand 
for more than four months at most in the face of waves of protest, 
while El- Assad regime has been able to confront the opposition, 
the street, and international sanctions with the help of the elitist 
cohesion of the power pyramid, and among the Alawite 
community, and because the United States is well-aware of the 
secret of this force, it is trying to continue sanctions, and to 
allocate an essential part of it to people closest to the President, 
in an attempt to break up that cohesion, which would then indicate 




      In this context, it should be noted that the United States 
legislator-in article 305 of the Act-has set a five-year period for 
the termination of its validity (Caesar Syria Civilian Protection 
Act of 2019). This means that the law is not open, so there may 
be no reason to reconsider its sanctions as long as the Syrian 
regime shows no real intention to make the required changes. 
Therefore, the scenario of continuity looks like the closest 
possible scenarios, especially at the moment. 
 
 Depenalization scenario:  
The sanctions lifting scenario is subject to Article 301 of the 
lifting Index, where the article marked "sanctions Suspension" 
refers to the possibility of the President suspending the penalties 
in whole or in part for periods not exceeding 180 days if he 
considers that the following criteria have been met: (Caesar Syria 
Civilian Protection Act of 2019). 
 
 The Syrian Government or the Russian Government cease 
using Syrian airspace to target the civilian population.  
 The removal of isolation from areas besieged by the Syrian 
regime, Russia, Iran, or any other foreign person that 
prevents humanitarian access, freedom of movement, and 
medical care. 
  Release of all political prisoners, allowing international 
human rights organizations to carry out appropriate 
investigations.  
 Stop deliberate targeting by the Syrian regime, Russia, Iran, 
or any other foreign person of medical facilities, schools, 
residential areas, and places of civil assembly.  
 The Syrian Government has taken severe steps to fulfil its 
obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on their destruction and to sign the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Biological and Toxin 
Weapons and on their defeat. 
  The Syrian regime allowed the safe, voluntary, and 
dignified return of Syrians displaced by the conflict.  
 The Syrian Government has taken serious steps to establish 
meaningful accountability for the perpetrators of war crimes 
in Syria and justice for the victims of such crimes.  
 
The question of reinstatement of sanctions shall cease after the 
lifting of the sanctions in cases where the President determines 
that the standards described for lifting are no longer met (Caesar 
Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019). which means that the 
Syrian regime, one of its Russian or Iranian partners, or any other 
foreign person found to be working with the administration has 
been suspended or sanctions have been lifted accordingly. 
 
4.  Discussion 
This paper focused on trying to find a relationship between the 
stated reasons for the adoption by the United States of the Caesar 
Act, which is essential to protect Syrian civilians, and the 
consequences of the sanctions imposed by the law on civilians 
themselves, especially on the social and economic levels. The law 
contributes negatively to:  
 
First: starving Syrian civilians, as it pushes them even more 
toward extreme poverty, most notably after the collapse of the 
Syrian Lira and the increase of prices, and the inability of many 
workers from the middle classes, which have become practically 
destitute, so there it has been a significant caste shift, according 
to which the middle class has disappeared, and society is divided 
between a wealthy class that enjoys all privileges and powers, 
which is a small, pro-regime class, and a vast type that includes 
the rest of the Syrian civilians, workers, merchants, artisans, etc. 
Second, the Act is also undermining Russia's reconstruction 
efforts, building on and promoting its projects among global 
companies. Everyone today has many concerns about the U.S. 
sanctions, so brokers who mediate between the Syrian regime and 
various foreign companies and institutions have become more 
active. 
 
It is true that the paper did not deal much with the political 
consequences of the Act by focusing on the new political 
economy, which systematically imposes the economic 
implications of political events, and on the importance of the 
humanitarian threat that the Act poses to millions of Syrians who 
are stuck in their country, but this does not deny that there are 
many political consequences of the law. Especially on the level 
of elite cohesion within power in Syria - as it was notified before 
- which is one of the most dangerous consequences for Bashar Al-
Assad's regime that managed to resist change thanks to this 
important one, as targeting those close to El-Assad would 
represent a big blow to the authority on the far level. This is 
because the system symbols are isolated from their outer 
surroundings. 
 
These results for researchers in the field of political sciences 
represent a theoretical entry for studying the political economy of 
the Syrian crisis. they are one of the most critical axes in learning 
the Syrian crisis or the current conflict in the Middle East, 
considering what the economic consequences represent in 
particular for the Syrian Ocean in Lebanon, Iran, and Turkey. The 
results for other disciplines, such as law and economics, provide 
input for understanding the Act's political nature. While allowing 
the public to read, follow, and be interested in Syrian affairs. 
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Therefore, it will enable the non-political dimensions of political 
issues to be recognized. 
 
5. Conclusion  
This paper ultimately comes up with a set of objective findings 
that constitute a preliminary reading of the implications of the 
Caesar Civil Protection Act for the Syrian people, and it can 
summarize these findings according to the following points:  
 
- The Caesar Civil Protection Act in Syria has contributed to 
a new economic reality in Syria and its geopolitical 
surroundings, especially after many economic agents have 
withdrawn from the scene for fear of U.S. sanctions, which 
has opened the door widely to the emergence of brokers and 
intermediaries.  
- The new economic reality has led to a drop in the Syrian 
pound's price against the dollar and a rise in the price of 
consumer materials, which has contributed directly to 
increasing poverty rates in Syria. 
- The closure of Lebanese banks against Syrian civilians has 
also contributed to a further decline in the price of the Syrian 
Lira, especially as these banks have been established for 
many decades, precisely after the Syrian crisis, their only 
external outlet in the world.  
- The Caesar Act, which protects Syrian civilians in a 
negative and opposite way while trying to protect civilians 
from aerial bombardment, and the regime's indignation, is, 
in return contributing to their hunger, forcing them to live 
at the mercy of insufficient humanitarian aid.  
- The Caesar Civilian Protection Act in Syria imposes severe 
penalties on the Syrian regime's pillars, targeting, to a 
greater extent, those close to power and decision-making 
centers to dismantle the elitist cohesion that has 
characterized the regime throughout the crisis years. 
- All indications suggest that the sanctions in force in the 
Caesar Act will continue to be applied after John Biden’s 
arrival to the U.S. presidency. The law was enacted with the 
Democrats and Republicans' approval in Congress, so that 
the lifting of sanctions seems a little distant, particularly 
when El- Assad regime does not respond to sanctions.  
 
These preliminary findings are a result of Biography research. 
They need to be complemented by future studies, particularly at 
the specialty field level, so this paper will try to work in the future 
on another field of study, using appropriate methodological tools 
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